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Abstract - The proliferation and popularity of smart
autonomous systems necessitates the development
of methods and models for ensuring the effective
identification of their owners and controllers. The aim
of this paper is to critically discuss the responsibility of
Things and their impact on human affairs. This starts
with an in-depth analysis of IoT Characteristics such
as Autonomy, Ubiquity and Pervasiveness. We argue
that Things governed by a controller should have an
identifiable relationship between the two parties and
that authentication and non-repudiation are essential
characteristics in all IoT scenarios which require
trustworthy communications. However, resources can
be a problem, for instance, many Things are designed
to perform in low-powered hardware. Hence, we also
propose a protocol to demonstrate how we can achieve the
authenticity of participating Things in a connectionless
and resource-constrained environment.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE INTERNET OF THINGS
It has been attributed a variety of labels: the Internet of
Things (IoT) [2], the Internet of Everything (IoE) [5] , the
Future Internet (FI) [6], and so on. Research and Industry
have, and are still developing protocols and standards for
it: Electronic Product Code (EPC) [24], Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) [8], micro IP (uIP) [15], Routing Protocol
for Low Energy and Lossy Networks (RPL) [17], Ad hoc On-
Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [17], Bluetooth Embedded
System (BTE)[16] , Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [19], Long
Term Evolution (LTE) [11] and LTE-Advanced (LTE-A, i.e.
4G), If This Then That (IFTTT) [22], [3] , IPv6 over Low-
Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [15], are
some of the standards and protocols being developed for use in
the IoT. Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [12], Mobile IPv6
(MIPv6) [15], [14], has been developed and made available
in time to enable the unique addressing of billions of nodes
thus fostering and enabling the IoT. The benefits of the IoT
are widely discussed in the literature.
Several companies including Cisco [4] among others, have
talked about the potential economic, financial benefits (govern-
ments of Europe, China, USA, etc). The lifestyle management
benefits and improvements to human life are being espoused
by industry and individuals, researchers and consumers, and
by governments and international conglomerates.
There is also a growing number of small companies and
projects working towards IoT driven solutions: Xively (https:
//xively.com/), TinyOS (http://tinyos.stanford.edu/tinyos-wiki/
index.php/Main_Page) [13], TransFabric, ContikiOS (http://
www.contiki-os.org/) [1] are a few of them.
Among the discussions about the benefits of the IoT,
potential security and privacy threats and challenges are also
discussed in the literature [7], [9], [10], [21]. This paper
addresses an issue which is however not gaining as much
attention as the issues of confidentiality and privacy: this issue
is Responsibility in a largely interconnected world.
Key Characteristics of the IoT are discussed in Section II;
Section III briefly discusses Weiser’s Vision of technologies that
are indistinguishable and invisible to human agents; potential
Future challenges within the IoT are presented in Section
IV; Section V defines Responsibility as it relates to the
IoT; Section VI-A makes some suggestions for addressing
the challenges presented earlier; the novel authentication and
identification protocol for resource-constrained nodes in the
IoT is presented in Section VII; Section VIII discusses Future
Work and concludes.
II. IOT CHARACTERISTICS
The IoT is a hybrid network. It is composed of software
and hardware components, physical and logical entities,
human and non-human nodes. It encompasses the Internet, all
Machine-to-Machine systems and human-to-human interactions
on social media. It adds a dimension of independence and
autonomy and meshes all pre-existing network systems into
a useful system of nodes and controllers. The IoT has some
essential characteristics that make it a different network and
justifies the attention it is receiving in academia, industry
and media. These characteristics (Fig.1) are Autonomy,
Pervasiveness and Ubiquity.
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Figure 1: IoT Characteristics Triangle
Autonomous Operation: The Characteristics of Autonomy
are embodied in the ability of nodes/devices/agents to be
Smart and to operate Independent of any control. This is a
crucial role that the nodes in the IoT are expected to be able
to deliver: independent decision-making.
Pervasiveness:Always Available, Always ON, Always
Accessible. It is to be always ON such that it can be accessed
readily
Ubiquity: Everywhere. Nodes or their representations
(e.g. their virtual online interfaces) must be accessible from
everywhere/globally accessible.
Each of these characteristics (Fig.2) can be associated
directly with certain features of the IoT nodes (or devices).
These features include:
Smartness: the characteristic that means a node can do
much more than its less-smart counterpart;
Independent: In addition to it’s advanced feature and
abilities, nodes are able to operate of their own “will" so to
speak;
Availability and Accessibility: IoT nodes are, of necessity
expected to, through available communication links, be always
within reach of their owners for control reasons or just for
reasons of access e.g. to retrieve data about presences within
a home environment;
Everywhere: IoT network, by its nature as the network
that encompasses all other networks physical and logical, and
that it includes everyday items which have the extra abilities
(smartness) of communication and/or computing and/or control,
this means that the physical environment however rural or urban,
will become a subset of the IoT. For instance, a farmer in a
remote village that
The Internet of 
Things
Autonomy
Smart Independent
Ubiquity
Everywhere
Pervasiveness
Always Available, 
Always  Accessible
Figure 2: Expanded IoT characteristics
III. WEISER’S VISION
In the 1991 paper, “The Computer for the 21st Century"
[23] Mark Weiser presented a vision of how technology will
become seamlessly integrated into human affairs and lives that
the best ones will be the ones that are indistinguishable i.e.
do not stand out as separate from us but form a key part of
our everyday ordinary existence. This is partly what the IoT
is to become: everyday and ordinary. When faced with the
question about when the IoT will happen, the answer is clear
because the IoT is already a part of our lives in the form of
Smart devices that more and more humans are beginning to
rely on for communication (Smart Phones), entertainment and
connectivity (Smart Phones, Smart Televisions), transportation
(Smart Cars, Drones (Amazon)), Wars and Security (Drones
and Quad-copters), Games and Sports (Drones racing, Smart
Shoes - Nike), Healthcare (Smart Pills, Robotic surgical arms),
Community Management (Smart Cities), Customer Service
(Walmart, etc.), Smart watches, smart bulbs, smart meters,
smart heaters, elderly care (Smart comfort Toys) to name a
few. They will continue to play more roles in our every day
lives
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES
We identify and present several challenges in this section.
These challenges do not relate to the potential financial value
of the IoT or its value to society as a system which can
be used to make things better, faster, seamless and make
life easier for humanity. The challenges presented here are
the ones that don’t appear to be gaining the attention of the
stakeholder in the so-called IoT industry. A few questions are
posed:
The Weakest Links?
What is the role of individuals in a highly-efficient,
interconnected world. Are end users still to be seen as the
weakest links in the security chain or should they be more
readily referred to as the most essential and potentially, most
important links in the chain? It is therefore, perhaps, time
to change the narrative: The user is no longer to simply be
seen as the weakest link but as the most essential link. This is
because within an environment such as a Smart Home (SH),
users will be expected to have a degree of control of their
homes. Users themselves will expect that even though their
homes have become smart this would not mean they should
relinquish total control of their homes. This means that a
sense of overriding control over all systems in their homes
including the security systems would be required by users. It
must therefore be impressed upon users the importance that
they maintain their sense of responsibility for their homes and
the nodes within the homes.
Responsibility
Hypothesis: Humans will be at the fore-front of managing
their security in their homes - just as they are today. Most
people physically lock their doors and windows as a way
to bolster secure and fortify their homes. They trust the
devices (window and door locks) to keep then safe and
separated from unwanted attention. Within the IoT/SH arena,
the only difference is that people will be required to trust
ubiquitous, trained, learning nodes with this task of securing
the fort. What would people’s response to this transference
of responsibility be? Will it be one of complete offloading?
Or might there be some resistance to a total transfer. The
answer to this question is not derived from a survey but from
an observance of natural ways of doing things. It can be
anticipated that people will still hope for some kind of control
over their nodes or the entire homes especially since, at their
core, SH are, essentially/effectively, homes.
Transference of Responsibility, liability and culpability
This is one of the main challenges that Cyber-physical
Systems (CPS) may be faced with. With autonomous nodes, it
will be possible for node owners to train their nodes to carry
out certain actions on their behalf. Should these actions result
in unfortunate circumstances, for instance, causing harm to
human agents, there is a potential for human agents to wish
to attribute blame for the actions and consequences of the
actions of smart, self-managing, decision-making non-human
nodes to them. It is perhaps necessary to recognise that
when damage or harm is caused by a human agent or a
non-human agent, the results and feedback (for the cause of
the damage or harm) are different (Table I). This transference,
if not properly handled, can lead to the next identified Challenge
Legal Quandary
The laws that guide the use of autonomous nodes must be
clearly spelt out especially since they are gradually becoming
more and more ubiquitous
Due to the rapid evolution of the IoT, Smart Environments
the legal frameworks that currently exist may need to adjust
to accommodate any emergent threats and offences that occur
within these systems. The law has managed to accommodate
crimes such as Data Theft, Tampering, accessing another’s
computer or device without permission under existing laws.
However, within the Cyber-physical Environment (CPE) of
the IoT, the offences may be a little more nuanced
Entity Responsibility Type Feedback
Human Consequential and/or Causal Punishment, Reprimand, Re-training
non-Human Causal Repair, Retirement, Re-training
Table I: Responsibility Type
Privacy
There has been a surge in interest in the subject of
Privacy especially with the recent growth of CP systems.
The conflicting situations where a significant amount of
unprocessed and processed data about individuals has and can
be made accessible and the fact that somehow this data is
required to provide certain services in CPE makes the issue of
privacy an interesting one to address. Some questions raised
by this conundrum include:
Irrelevant Privacy: Is there going to be such a thing? Does
it matter? Is Privacy with all the attendant arguments, now
irrelevant and if it is, should we be concerned?
Relative Privacy: It is essential to bear in mind that what
is deemed private information to you may be open to share
with someone else. Who decides what is best kept private per
person/individual? Is it ONLY what they have power over?
Take as an example, the public use of Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) technology. If you don’t want anyone to know that
you left your house today - i.e. you use the back door to avoid
saying hello to friends because you feel unwell, for instance-
what gives a CCTV operator the right to breach that personal
requirement by recording the fact that you actually physically
stepped out of your home. Are you implicitly guilty because
you want to be let alone?
At present a huge amount of data is being freely made
available by individuals on the Internet and other connected
forums. However, it must be recognised that among the
population samples, there are those who share their details
sparingly, if at all. There is, indeed, a proportion of the world’s
populace that does not necessarily deem it important to beam
out to the world, in minute detail, what you had for breakfast,
lunch, what came up and then what you had for dinner. What
rights do these people have in a fully-developed Cyber-physical
Environment?
In the event that service providers (traffic management,
electricity companies, home security solution providers) start to
manipulate (collect, analyse and process) our data in order to
study us and provide us ever-improved services, what choice do
we have in deciding what we want to share and what we do not
want to share? This data, however “anonymised", can be used
to build a profile of users and this profile, if closely-matched
to other collected data that may at first appear random, can be
used to draw a picture of the everyday activities of individuals.
These are just some areas that we might wish to ponder as
we enjoy the emergence of an interconnected world.
V. RESPONSIBILITY DEFINED
Responsibility is defined severally by the Oxford Dictionaries
website (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/
responsibility) as
“the state or fact of being accountable or to blame for
something." (human responsibility?) or
“a moral obligation to behave correctly towards or in
respect of" (non-human responsibility e.g. of a robot?).
It is also defined as
“a thing which one is required to do as part of a job, role,
or legal obligation"
and lastly as
“The opportunity or ability to act independently and
take decisions without authorization" (again, non-human
responsibility?)
These definitions highlight the fact that within the IoT, there
will be different kinds of responsibility and that it may be
possible to attribute responsibility for certain “events" to non-
human agents.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Present Solutions
1) Awareness: As robots become increasingly commonplace,
one suggestion for ensuring a smooth transition to this era is
through clear information to introduce users to the presence
of non-human nodes which perform the services in place of
humans. With autonomous, non-human agents such as robots,
we mustn’t be afraid - but we must be aware. In the case of
stores that have non-human agents performing the duties of
humans, at the very least, it must be made known to the public
that the store uses human-like robots.
Bearing in mind that Things can be Physical or Logical,
tangible or intangible, and that they can be controlled by direct
physical touch, remote control and self-learned, self-taught
action (see Fig.3), the following Thing Commandments are
suggested by [18]. These are not hard and fast rules. They are
simply recommendations that might be adopted wholly or as
separate unites depending on requirements.
2) The Thing Commandments: A set of Commandments
are herein presented.
Responsibility for Things and their actions
One of the characteristics of Things in the IoT as identified
in Fig.1 is Autonomy. Autonomy can be described as
independent action and decision-making. Things may act or
be caused to act in several different ways (Fig.3): based on
actions initiation directly a user e.g. light switch being flipped
manually; remotely e.g. turning a light bulb ON from outside
Direct/
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Control e.g. 
Tweets
Learned, Induced  
Independent action 
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Figure 3: Controlling Smart Things
a home using a mobile phone connected to the Internet; and
lastly, via “learned" control: a user can set up their home
network such that the lights come on at a particular time.
The home system then observes the user’s behaviour until
they (the lights) learn to switch their state to on at the right
time of the day. In the case where the device has learned the
user’s routine (or has been programmed) and it comes ON at
a particular time, this action is the responsibility of whom? It
is not obviously the user’s because of the inherent fact that
humans are not wholly predictable and even those who have a
pattern can deviate from their patterns should the need arise.
Are humans now to be criticised for being human?
Picture a landscape with driver-less cars, drones i.e.
non-human agents interacting independent of human control
and observation. In such an environment it will be essential
to remember the first Thing Commandment - “Your Thing is
Your Thing" and, therefore your Responsibility.
Illegal Access
Access people’s non-human nodes without permission must
still be deemed improper behaviour. This is especially
important in the CP Environment of the IoT where modes
such as drones can be taken control of by rogue controllers
and used for malicious purposes.
Relationships between Things
Things owned by a user should have an identifiable
relationship with each other. The method of polling
each other or having logical or even physical markers
may prove invaluable in situations where a node
has turned up in an unexpected environment (see
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/
11458116/Drone-spotted-over-French-military-site.html). If
a drone is abandoned by a - possibly panicked - owner, or
even deliberately, it will be essential for law enforcement
agencies to be able to identify the node’s owner and most
recent controller.
Authenticated Communication
Things owned by a user should have be able to identify
communication between with each other. This can be achieved
- and is already being achieved - through the use of existing
and future authentication mechanisms.
Usability and Ease of Use
This commandment discusses how nodes designed for use as
part of a CPE must be easy to control and use by end users.
If this commandment is not applied then there is a risk that
systems may be too complicated for users and that companies
may exploit the relative lack of knowledge of people to charge
them for installations. It must be recognised that just because
a person is buying a smart car/television/fridge does not mean
they should be expected to sit through hours of training on
how to adapt to using these new systems. The transfer should
ideally be seamless and practically invisible to users [23].
Control
All things should be controllable by their owners
Control their physical and logical behaviour. This will be used
to avoid trojan Horse defences. the users should recognise the
potential for them to be the culprits or liable.
Ownership
Things must have owners. Everything must have an owner that
is clearly and readily identifiable. A marker or label on the
things which can be accessed readily is one way to meet this
requirement. Another is through the use of logical markers
e.g. bar codes that can be scanned to reveal ownership, unique
identifiers such as Media Access Control (MAC) addresses on
Network Interface Cards (NIC) cards
Inverse ownership relationship
The use of smart nodes promise to apparently improve the way
things are done and make things easier for humans thereby
affording them more time to concentrate on things that they
deem more important. A car and public traffic system that
decide the best and fasted route to work are a good option and
a driver of such a car may choose to then take that route and
not worry about getting to work late due to traffic. However,
it essential for human agents to have a choice about whether
they wish to own or use autonomous nodes or not. This
commandment simply proposes the notion that Not everyone
needs to own Things.
Freedom From Things Refusing, disabling and destroying
or disposing of Things.
Humans should be free to get rid of nodes that they no longer
require. A non-human node may be disposed of at the user’s
discretion even if the non-human has a human-like form. A
kill switch - a remote or local physical button - on a robot will
therefore be essential. The decision to stop a robot offending
will be deemed the responsibility of the owner or controller of
the robot where these can be one and the same individual or
more than one entity.
B. Best Mistakes
There are undoubtedly going to be teething issues including
in areas of security, privacy, damage, and loss. However,
among these, there will be issues that are in this section
referred to as mistakes.
1) Attributing Responsibility is not an important issue: This
appears to be the status quo currently with the deployment
of Smart Nodes and devices. There does not seem to be
any coherent effort geared towards recognising the roles,
responsibilities and expectations from human agents in their
use, ownership and association with smart, autonomous
non-human nodes (see http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/15/
politics/aircraft-lands-on-capitol-grounds/).
For reasons already discussed, it is important to be able
to identify owners or at least agents who may have remote
and/or local access to autonomous nodes. This includes nodes
such as personal/recreational drones.
One solution is presented in Section VII where one method
of establishing trusted communication between nodes is
discussed.
One way would be for Things to always poll their owners
(or current controllers) and vice-versa when they are ACTIVE.
This way, if an attacker takes over control of a node which is
programmed to poll its current controller, then whoever has
control of the node can be identified.
2) If all else fails, blame the robots: Or, perhaps not.
The biggest mistake that will be made in the IoT will
be to lay comprehensive blame and responsibility for faults
on intelligent, independent, autonomous non-human agents.
This will be detrimental to their purpose. Whatever decisions
autonomous machines make will be made within the realm
of what their creators “identify" as good decision-making
unless(that is, of course,until they are granted the capabilities
to make independent, original decisions not influenced by
prior information). But then, what will be the point of having
robots? The intention is for them to “serve" a purpose. This
therefore means that we have to influence the way they
think by infludencing their behaviours and habits with prior
knowledge of what we consider to be right and what we
deem to be wrong. This can be, at first, a set of simple
rules. After this, we will need to introduce them to what, for
instance, a convenience store manager considers good and
what she deems to be wrong by allowing the robot to observe
and learn from other store staff as well as the store’s customers.
VII. RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL (RECAP)
In response to the challenges of ownership, identification,
authentication and non-repudiation, we propose that these
core security requirements must be realised at the design
level. Any IoT device that is able to initiate or respond
to communication can also include embedded security at
the manufacturer following an approach similar to the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), currently used to secure
hardware [20]. However, if TPM is adopted, it can be resource
consuming if applied directly to offer facilities to low-power
and resource-constrained IoT systems. TPM has been designed
to support many security features such as verifying device
integrity and examining whether the existing configuration
of a device has been altered since the last session or not. In
our work, we scope our objective at the essential requirement
of providing means to identify each device and support
sufficient authentication and integrity check in a connectionless
environment using Public Key Cryptography (PKC). In a
connectionless environment each message (e.g. a control
command to the IoT device) is transmitted separately, there
is no conversation (or session) initiated between the two
communicating parties
We argue that, Things must always include an integrated PKC
key pair to achieve mutual authentication, further to the security
advantage of the design, the device will not be required to
support any extra functions to perform key generation. Overall,
to support our protocol, the IoT device should:
• Include an embedded key pair (Public/Private keys), the
private key must be secured and protected.
• Memory space to store an external Public key (from a
server)
• A static ID
Realising security for Things must be fast, the number of
required connections must be reduced to the least and the
application must not rely on the availability of third parties
such as Certificate Authorities (CA). After all, CA can not
easily exist for resource-constrained infrastructure.
The following steps demonstrate how the ReCAP protocol
works in a Smart Home scenario; the notations used are
explained in Table II.
A. Registration
SH-d registration with SH-s:
SH-d −→ SH-s: IDSH−d, PUBSH−d, TSENT , SIGSH−d
Where,
SIGSH−d = [ h (IDSH−d | PUBSH−d | TSENT ) ]
...
SHS −→ SHD: IDSH−s, PUBSH−s, TSENT , SIGSH−s
Where,
SIGSH−s = [ h (IDSH−s | PUBSH−s | TSENT ) ]
The implementation of ReCAP requires a server. The
server will act as a proxy which dictates all communications
between the device and the outside world and documents
every interaction in log files to support the work of Incident
Responders and Digital Forensics Investigations. Registration
is mandatory when the device is connected for the first time.
The device registers its ID and shares its Public key with a
dedicated server. These values are sent with a signed hash
to maintain the integrity of the information shared. Time is
included in the hash for synchronisation purposes and to
realise the time this transaction was first initiated. This could
also prevent replay attacks.
B. Authentication
(i) Authenticating messages from SH-s to SH-d:
SH-s −→ SH-d: IDSH−d, MSH−s, TSENT , SIGSH−s
Where,
SIGSH−s = [ EPRI {h (IDSH−d | MSH−s | TSENT )} ]
Once the device is registered, every message communicated
from the server can now be authenticated against a hash signed
by the private key of the server. This is possible because the
device has the public key of the server in its memory as an
outcome of the one-time registration process. This mechanism
maintains authenticity and non-repudiation of each message
exchanged. Similarly, messages from the device to the server
can be authenticated as in the following step.
(ii) Authenticating messages from SH-d to SH-s:
SH-d −→ SH-s: IDSH−s, MSH−d, TSENT , SIGSH−d
Where,
SIGSH−d = [ EPRI {h (IDSH−d | MSH−d | TSENT )} ]
Notation Description
SH-d Smart-Home device
SH-s Smart-Home server
ID Unique identifier
PUB Public key
PRI Private key
TSENT Time
SIG Digital signature
EPRI {...} Data encryption with a private key
h(...) Hash function
| Denotes concatenation
M Message to be authenticated
Table II: Protocol Notations
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The work investigated the subject of Responsibility in
Cyber-Physical Environments; while it is not currently
clear how responsibility will be attributed in these types
of systems, we concluded that for the sake of supporting
Digital Forensics investigations, several data sources need to
be made available; these sources include the network logs
of node connections as well as the communication data of
links between the participating nodes. Taking the extreme
example of resource-constrained IoT environment, we have
presented a protocol to authenticate messages. The essential
requirement was to support fundamental security principles
but without considering the confidentiality of data. We argued
this was necessary as part of the trade-off between security
and the implementation of resource-constrained Things. The
ReCAP protocol demonstrates that achieving non-repudiation
is feasible, which helps to establish links alongside the
Cyber-Physical Environments.
Further work could be directed towards conducting a
critical evaluation of the performance of different protocol
implementations. For instance, the currently proposed ReCAP
compared to an altered version where we attempt to maintain
more security features such as confidentiality by encrypting
exchanged messages.
Other research strands may be developed as part of the
discussion around Responsibility in the IoT. One such strand
is the development of a Legal Framework to guide the use and
ownership and ethical retirement of Autonomous Systems as
well as laws that can be used to try cases where autonomous,
non-human, nodes independently act and cause harm and where
their actions have adverse effects on human agents. This can be
through a system of Autonomous Systems Law, Law that deals
with the investigation and prosecution of cases that involve
autonomous agents e.g. robots.
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